China&Eurasia

China (中华人民共和国)

          China is the third country as territory and also it is the first one of the world in population percepective. Its territory is about 9. 6 million square kilometres and have the biggest population is the country that attracts attention with its rich history, original structure of civilization and rising up.

           Until the begining of 19th century, China was a more developed country than other areas of the world, but after Industry Revolution, it could not keep in the same step with other European coutries on tecnology and overseas trade,so it declined,sharply.China kept in the backround of other powers such as Germany,Japan,Russia,Britain and the USA on the balance of  powers in the world.

           After the Cold War ,a new vision of politics and economics became on world order especially with the effects of globalization.Therefore, China became aware of this changing as early,and came into action.

           Today, China’s huge appetite for energy and resources as it is the biggest consumer of the world of coal, steel and copper and as an oil and electricity. At the same time, cheap Chinese consumer goods that are higher quality in the world markets and cheap labour force at endangering jobs, both in industrialized countries in the North and developing countries in the South are soem important figures of China in energy area on the world.

         Eurasia Region

Eurasia is like a bridge between Asia and Europe. Peace and stability in the region would provide China with the much desired land routes to Europe and beyond, so no country desires peace and stability in the region, more than China, because turbulence in the region would undermine the future of political and economic cooperation in the region.

When we look at the history of Euroasia region,it is seen there were two forceful countries,Russia and China,especially after the collepse of Soviet Union. However, after 11 September Event ,the effect of the USA started to become stronger on the region,so there were a polarization as three different dimensions.

-The Position of China in the Region with Its Interets,Relations and Threats-

Beijing, also known as Peking that is the capital of the People's Republic of China,[1] does not want any instability in the region because of the probability of this instability to have a negative effect on China. The Republics of The Middle Asia are neither homogeneous structures nor threats with the military capacity for China,but because of the Xinjiang,they are so important for China’s security.In this case, having good relations with the Middle Asia countries is not dispensable. Living of minority groups at borders and having several natural resources that are necessary for China’s development are some of the important perspectives of their mainings for China.

The Eurasia strategy of China includes  building up good relations with other new countries in the region with financial helps, Shangai Cooparation Organization,1996.Also,it  made several agreements with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that it has comman borders.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a Regional Security and China’s Interests

           In 1996 Shangai Five was founded and they expected to provide political and economical stability in region and to prevent Islamic independence in Central Asia. Controlling separatism is important point for Chinese control over the East Turkestan Region.  It is China’s north-west part and it has borders with

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[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beijing

Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Kashmir. Central Asian states have common culture, religion, languages, and ethnic ties with East Turkestan’s people. Therefore stability plays a vital role for China’s interests in Central Asia because instability in region might threaten the Chinese control over the East Turkestan Region. Although the organization has a big importance for integration and provides security in Central Asia by combating terrorism, stability would pave way for the superpower in the region to have full control of the wealth the region has to offer.

          China&Russia Relations and its the USA perspective

          Eurasia region is a geostrategic region that is important for other powers’ competition in the international system. China knows that it can not block the Russian power in the region in short term.

Russia and China cooperate with each other to provide the energy and technology they both need. Both countries have similarities such as: separatist movements (Chechnya and East Turkestan), both are members of the Shangai Cooperation Organization(SCO), radical groups, and security problems are present in both countries, therefore they aim to have sustainable energy resources and trade routes planning. Shangai Cooperation Organization is significant for Central Asia’s future and for world politics. The main point is that SCO is used as a tool for their interests but in the future it can be a possible obstacle to their interests. SCO was established primarily to counter such threats. China was the driving force behind the establishment of SCO as it started taking all measures necessary to curb separatist tendencies and elements in its border regions. SCO was meant to be a platform where all the member states would join hands to counter regional security threats like terrorism, extremism and separatism.

The strategic glue in bilateral relations between China and Russia has been co-operation against terrorism and separatism. Both countries also enjoy relatively friendly relations with North Korea and Iran, putting them at odds with the United States. On the other hand, Moscow is troubled by the diversification of Beijing’s energy relations and would prefer the People’s Republic to be more dependent for its oil and gas deliveries on a pipeline system operated and owned by Russia. As a result, there is a strategic competition over pipeline systems. Moscow argues that new resources should be tied to the Russian transport network as far as possible, while Beijing prefers a system transiting Central Asia and passing through Xinjiang into China. Moscow initially expected Chinese support for greater Russian control over regional energy resources but quickly realised Beijing was utterly opposed to this. China has established new sources of energy and transit routes lying outside Russian control. Unless a compromise is reached, these highly divergent views could eventually create serious tensions between the two countries.

One of the most notable aspects of China and Russia’s emergence as the major actors in Central Asia is their emphasis on political stability, largely at the expense of democratic development. Neither Beijing nor Moscow has any incentive to promote democracy in the region; on the contrary, they have every incentive to help keep the more authoritarian Central Asian governments in power. Some of the blame here lies with Europe and the United States, which have halted their engagement in the region. Without any counterweight to Moscow and Beijing, there are few prospects of any regional move towards more open and accountable polities. Over time, more repressive regimes will be created, making far harder any Western attempt to engage reformist forces in Central Asia. In the long run, this will make it difficult for new actors to break through the solid political, economic and military co-operation that China and Russia will have established with the Central Asian states.

           Moreover, it's no secret that China needs energy and natural resources to sustain its industrialisation and urbanisation path, nor that it has to look for them abroad. For security reasons it makes sense for the country to diversify its sources, but more than that, China is looking for non-traditional export markets, as it moves up the value chain by seeking next generation technologies in advanced manufacturing, electronics and aerospace.For example,Chinese exports to Russia have risen from just $2.7 billion in 2001 to $28.5 billion in 2007—although as a percentage of its total exports, the increase from 1.4% to 2.4% is perhaps less impressive. Textiles, machinery and electrical equipment make up 55% of those exports, with the rest ranging from umbrellas to transportation equipment.

        The Chinese Strategy on Eurasia in the Resources of Energy Perspective

The question of energy is also fundamental to China’s Central Asia strategy. China, and the rest of Asia, has a need for energy that extends far beyond presently available resources. Central Asia could bridge part of this deficiency once its oil sector is fully functional with a proper pipeline system, hence China’s—and Russia’s—keen involvement in the region. The comparative absence of a European and US presence has caused the Central Asian states to move closer to Asia, a move that could have devastating financial effects in the West as it loses out on some very important assets, not to mention its failure to influence the region politically. No one would be happier to vacuum up Central Asia’s energy resources than China. 

Moreover, on a few energy exporters in the Middle East makes the People’s Republic vulnerable to political disputes in this volatile region. China could be forced to balance its concerns over energy security with political pressures from external powers, most notably the United States. Chinese industry and foreign trade could be severely affected by regime change or military conflict in any of China’s chief Middle Eastern energy suppliers. Additionally, energy trade with the Middle East comes attached with a $2-per-barrel premium that has been a heavy burden on Chinese imports. More diversified oil and gas imports, with some healthy competition between the exporting countries, could potentially decrease this premium.  

The priority China attaches to the energy potential of Central Asia is probably best exemplified by the record time in which the Atasu–Alashankou pipeline between Kazakhstan and Xinjiang was constructed. This landmark project in Sino-Central Asian energy relations began pumping oil in December 2005 and was completed in just ten months, thanks largely to the economic and political commitment of China. When the pipeline link between Kumkol and Kenkiyak in central Kazakhstan is completed, China will also have a direct link to the oilfields in northern Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea.

Furthermore, in terms of energy consumption, China is now second only to the United States. Its rapid pace of growth and increasing wealth of its citizens has led to spiraling demand for energy, and for oil in particular. In 1993, the country became an importer of oil and since then imports have risen steeply. Today, China imports 40percent of its oil supplies and its dependence on oil (and gas) imports will continue to grow.

Table-1 The Oil Import Dependense of China[2]

The Oil Import rate of China (%)

Year	(%)
2000	34
2010	60
2030	82

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[2] Fan He & Donghai Qin, ‘China’s Energy Strategy in the Twenty-First Century’, China & World Economy, Cilt:14, Sayı: 2, 2006, s.100

In the medium term, China’s efforts to enhance its energy security are likely to increase its influence in the Middle East. This will pose a challenge to U.S. dominance of this part of the world and further complicate the already difficult relations the United States has with a number of countries in the region, notably Iran, as the current dispute over Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

The results of China’s energy diplomacy are being observed with growing unease, especially in Asia, but also in other parts of the world. China’s impact on the world oil market is growing, but also its geopolitical impact. Competition for energy is exacerbating existing rivalries between China and a number of its neighbors.

         The Trade Relations of China with Eurasia

China makes no secret of its attempts to win trade advantages in Central Asia, advantages that can only be won at the expense of Russia, primarily, but also Europe and the United States. According to Chinese customs statistics, the trade volume between Central Asia and China increased from a total of $465 million in 1992 to $7.7 billion in November 2005. This is a tremendous growth, especially as no other country has been able to achieve a similar trade expansion with the Central Asian nations. China’s share still amounts only to approximately half of Russia’s trade with the region but is rapidly gaining ground on the latter in relative terms. China’s trade with Central Asia is primarily in natural resources, especially oil and gas, while Russia dominates the arms sales to the region.

Although the Chinese trade with Central Asia has increased rapidly, it should be put in perspective. Bilateral trade with Central Asian nations amounts to no more than 1 per cent of China’s total foreign trade and is focused on a few key resources. This relatively small trade is essentially with China’s western provinces, and it is estimated that up to 80 per cent of it is conducted through Xinjiang alone. The trade is also heavily disproportionate on the Central Asian side: close to 80 per cent of it is with Kazakhstan, while Turkmenistan accounts only for 1 per cent. In sum, the bilateral trade links are heavily concentrated on the border between Xinjiang and Kazakhstan. Beijing has been trying to involve other Chinese regions in trading with Central Asia, but the heavy emphasis on energy imports to China and the export advantages Xinjiang enjoys over other Chinese provinces mean the imbalance is likely to continue.

Central Asia also has a role to play as a transit region in China’s foreign trade. As the major trade gains to be won for China lie in reducing transaction costs with Europe, its largest foreign trading partner, Beijing has heavily promoted continental overland trade corridors. Transaction costs could be slashed if an effective land communication and transport corridor between China and Europe were established. Consequently, Beijing hopes to create a second Euro-Asia land bridge that would connect China, Central Asia and Europe. (The first Euro-Asia land bridge is the Trans-Siberian railway.) Currently, some 95 per cent of China’s trade with Europe is conducted through a complicated and costly system entailing road, rail and sea links. Delivery times via these routes can be anything from twenty to forty days, but if the proposed second Euro-Asia land bridge is realised it could cut the current transport time down to eleven days. Needless to say, this would make Chinese trade with Europe even more competitive, and make Europe a more attractive trading partner for China.

Besides the economic gains, a competitive overland communication network would tie China closer to both Central Asia and Europe. The transit fees accruing to the Central Asian states would give them a significant economic boost and also ensure the political interest and engagement of both China and Europe in stabilising and developing the region.

China has also invested substantially in developing a viable infrastructure linking Xinjiang with the neighbouring Central Asian nations. A railway between China, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan has been planned, but its huge costs are prohibitive. China has improved its link with Kyrgyzstan by renovating the Osh–Sarytash–Irkeshtam highway running from the Kyrgyz south to the border of the People’s Republic. The China Development Bank has financed with a $30 million grant the Norak tunnel under the Shar-Shar pass in central Tajikistan. China has also helped develop Kyrgyzstan’s power stations and power-transmission lines, both within Kyrgyzstan and across the border to Kashgar in western China. The same applies to Kazakhstan, where the China Development Bank has assisted in constructing power-transmission lines to Xinjiang and in modernising power plants such as those in the north-eastern Kazakh town of Ekibastuz.

Finally, we should mention about CEBA on trade between China and Euroasia ;

China Eurasia Business Association (CEBA) is a non-profit organization strategically linking business enterprises of China and Eurasia countries – Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan. It aims to promote regional trade and cooperation, assisting companies to find partners, clients and markets for their products. 

Accelerating trade between China and Eurasia countries, totaling over US$ 22bn in 2008, is creating exciting opportunities for large, medium and small businesses in resources, services and infrastructure, consumer goods sectors. To facilitate its activities and provide best possible service, CEBA has representatives in Beijing, Almaty, and Ulaanbaatar.

CEBA offers unique networking opportunities to business enterprises from and interested in China and Eurasia region. CEBA strives to deliver value and service quality to its members, providing up-to-date advice, research and market-entry support to China and to Eurasia region. Partnership network provided by CEBA, equips its members with global experience and local expertise to face any challenges in the region with confidence and knowledge.

            Conclusion 

The present Chinese policy towards minorities is conducted with three essential aspects: these are identification and recognition of minorities, limited autonomy and repressive policy. The overall goal of the Chinese policy towards minority groups is assimilation. However, these three aspects have influenced the Uighurs adversely and have reinforced their ethnic identity in the post-1949 era.
         The Chinese government carried out the process of ascertaining ethnic identification and recognition following the pioneer study of the Chinese sociologist Fei Xiaoton. Xiaotond undertook a detailed study in the field and were able to identify 400 minority groups. As a result the Han Minzu was recognized as majority and the Shaosh Minzu as minority. However the major critics against PRC in identifying a nationality in China is its application of the Stalinist  definition of a nation based on four common elements ; which are common language, geography, life and culture . Moreover scholars strongly argue that it shouldn't be totally applied since it disregards the diverse identities in China.
         The second aspect of Chinese policy towards minority groups is characterized by “de jure autonomy'. In the strict sense of the term it is a limited autonomy. Although five autonomous provinces were officially established, the 1954 Chinese constitution clearly bars the right to secession. Instead it introduces regional autonomy. Under the same leverage the Uighur society was populated in the East Turkestan province. However, the introduction of regional autonomy accompanied by Han migration to East Turkestan turned the autonomous Uighur society into minority group in that area. This policy has eroded the very basis of autonomy extended to minority group.

         The repressive policies of the Chinese government against the Uighur community has created chaos and reinforced their identity to the extent of the Uighurs exposition to mortal threats. Mortal threat refers to threat against the community's existence. To this effect the Uighurs established Bingtuan or Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) in 1954. It is basically a quasi-military organization meant for control of the ethnic minority in East Turkestan. The XPCC was dissolved in 1975; however, in 1981 it has been re-established mainly to serve as instrument for Chinese influence in the area. In the 1990s the XPCC has been placed the authority of the central government. It functions as a caretaker of the economy in the normal times, whereas it serves as an effective army, in unrest times, to suppress resentment from East Turkestan.

          In terms of cultural threats there are also actions taken by China. Chinese government has been spending efforts in institutionalizing Chinese language and curbing religious freedoms. These efforts served to the dilution of Uighur culture and threatened their identity. Over the last half-century the Chinese language has been institutionalized in the spheres of education, work and regional administration. The greatest assault on Uighur's identity is on their religion, Islam. Chinese government desires to build a strong China and does not recognize the ethnic character of the Uighurs movement. The question of separation or secession does not exist in the Chinese perception of the Uighurs issue. Above all China regards East Turkestan as an integral part of itself and hence it determinedly makes all effort to avoid national disintegration or it is considered as ‘Spiitizim’.

These cases, along with Chinese actions beyond Eurasia, exemplify China’s so called “peaceful rise”. There is no force or threat to this unless one wants to count the pressures of the market as force. Companies and governments who cannot meet their debts or are short of cash will generally look for lenders who offer the most favorable terms. And in the current climate China, sitting atop enormous cash reserves, is more than willing to offer such terms in return for exclusive access to the product, below-market prices, and opportunities for further equity access in those firms and countries. In this way, these borrowers get their cash but they also suffer, as debtors habitually do, from a loss of freedom of action. To a considerably greater degree than before, they are tied to China’s economic chariot and to its economic and political preferences. In this context, it is hardly a surprise that for years Russian leaders have been publicly warning that if Russia did not get its house in order, China would gain a commanding economic position in Russian Asia, or warning against the rise of China as exporter, importer, and now lender in Central Asia.

China is undoubtedly emerging as one of the two major actors in Central Asia, and over time it may become the most powerful. The relative decline of Russia and the failure of the West to act in the region have played out well for China. Its growing influence in Central Asia has created the potential for a power struggle with Russia. Nevertheless, both states will remain for the foreseeable future the major regional actors. Politically, the West has been increasingly marginalised as a result of Beijing’s strategy to increase its own role in Central Asia and the failure of the West to understand the situation there. Should this continue, Central Asia risks being dominated by China and Russia, and the region as a whole will move in a less democratic direction.

Resources;

*’Çin’in Avrasya Stratejisi’ / Barış Adıbelli

* http://www.usak.org.tr/dosyalar/dergi/yC7Rs651dAHbXQIUFf9YCkm8ZOkeVD.pdf

*’Büyük Avrasya Projesi ABD,Rusya ve Çin’in Varolma Mücadelesi’ / Barış Adıbelli

* Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütü: Çin Ve Rusya’nın Avrasya Açılımı / Ahmet HACALOĞLU K.

*http://www.sbe.deu.edu.tr/dergi/cilt4.say%C4%B13/4.3%20ugrasiz.pdf

*http://www.usak.org.tr/dosyalar/dergi/yC7Rs651dAHbXQIUFf9YCkm8ZOkeVD.pdf

*http://www.china-eurasia.org/

*http://blogs.euobserver.com/petersen/2010/07/10/china-and-eurasian-energy/
*http://www.chinaeurasia.org/