China (中华人民共和国)
China is the third country as territory
and also it is the first one of the world in population percepective. Its
territory is about 9. 6 million square
kilometres and have the biggest population is the country that attracts
attention with its rich history, original structure of civilization and rising
up.
Until the begining of 19th century, China
was a more developed country than other areas of the world, but after Industry
Revolution, it could not keep in the same step with other European coutries on
tecnology and overseas trade,so it declined,sharply.China kept in the backround
of other powers such as Germany,Japan,Russia,Britain and the USA on the balance
of powers in the world.
After the Cold War ,a new vision of
politics and economics became on world order especially with the effects of
globalization.Therefore, China became aware of this changing as early,and came
into action.
Today, China’s huge appetite for energy
and resources as it is the biggest consumer of the world of coal, steel and
copper and as an oil and electricity. At the same time, cheap Chinese consumer
goods that are higher quality in the world markets and cheap labour force at
endangering jobs, both in industrialized countries in the North and developing
countries in the South are soem important figures of China in energy area on
the world.
Eurasia Region
Eurasia
is like a bridge between Asia and Europe. Peace and stability in the region
would provide China with the much desired land routes to Europe and beyond, so
no country desires peace and stability in the region, more than China, because
turbulence in the region would undermine the future of political and economic
cooperation in the region.
When
we look at the history of Euroasia region,it is seen there were two forceful
countries,Russia and China,especially after the collepse of Soviet Union.
However, after 11 September Event ,the effect of the USA started to become
stronger on the region,so there were a polarization as three different
dimensions.
-The
Position of China in the Region with Its Interets,Relations and Threats-
Beijing, also known as Peking that is the
capital of the People's Republic of China,[1] does not want any
instability in the region because of the probability of this instability to
have a negative effect on China. The Republics of The Middle Asia are neither
homogeneous structures nor threats with the military capacity for China,but
because of the Xinjiang,they are so important for China’s security.In this
case, having good relations with the Middle Asia countries is not dispensable. Living
of minority groups at borders and having several natural resources that are
necessary for China’s development are some of the important perspectives of
their mainings for China.
The
Eurasia strategy of China includes
building up good relations with other new countries in the region with
financial helps, Shangai Cooparation Organization,1996.Also,it made several agreements with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan that it has comman borders.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a Regional Security and China’s Interests
In 1996 Shangai Five was founded and they expected to provide political and economical stability in region and to prevent Islamic independence in Central Asia. Controlling separatism is important point for Chinese control over the East Turkestan Region. It is China’s north-west part and it has borders with
1
Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Kashmir. Central Asian states have common culture,
religion, languages, and ethnic ties with East Turkestan’s people. Therefore
stability plays a vital role for China’s interests in Central Asia because
instability in region might threaten the Chinese control over the East
Turkestan Region. Although the organization has a big importance for
integration and provides security in Central Asia by combating terrorism,
stability would pave way for the superpower in the region to have full control
of the wealth the region has to offer.
China&Russia Relations and its the USA perspective
Eurasia
region is a geostrategic region that is important for other powers’ competition
in the international system. China knows that it can not block the Russian
power in the region in short term.
Russia and China cooperate with each other to
provide the energy and technology they both need. Both countries have
similarities such as: separatist movements (Chechnya and East Turkestan), both
are members of the Shangai Cooperation Organization(SCO), radical groups, and
security problems are present in both countries, therefore they aim to have
sustainable energy resources and trade routes planning. Shangai Cooperation
Organization is significant for Central Asia’s future and for world politics.
The main point is that SCO is used as a tool for their interests but in the
future it can be a possible obstacle to their interests. SCO was established
primarily to counter such threats. China was the driving force behind the
establishment of SCO as it started taking all measures necessary to curb
separatist tendencies and elements in its border regions. SCO was meant to be a
platform where all the member states would join hands to counter regional
security threats like terrorism, extremism and separatism.
The strategic glue in bilateral relations between
China and Russia has been co-operation against terrorism and separatism. Both
countries also enjoy relatively friendly relations with North Korea and Iran,
putting them at odds with the United States. On the other hand, Moscow is
troubled by the diversification of Beijing’s energy relations and would prefer
the People’s Republic to be more dependent for its oil and gas deliveries on a
pipeline system operated and owned by Russia. As a result, there is a strategic
competition over pipeline systems. Moscow argues that new resources should be
tied to the Russian transport network as far as possible, while Beijing prefers
a system transiting Central Asia and passing through Xinjiang into China.
Moscow initially expected Chinese support for greater Russian control over
regional energy resources but quickly realised Beijing was utterly opposed to
this. China has established new sources of energy and transit routes lying
outside Russian control. Unless a compromise is reached, these highly divergent
views could eventually create serious tensions between the two countries.
One of the most notable aspects of China and
Russia’s emergence as the major actors in Central Asia is their emphasis on
political stability, largely at the expense of democratic development. Neither
Beijing nor Moscow has any incentive to promote democracy in the region; on the
contrary, they have every incentive to help keep the more authoritarian Central
Asian governments in power. Some of the blame here lies with Europe and the
United States, which have halted their engagement in the region. Without any
counterweight to Moscow and Beijing, there are few prospects of any regional
move towards more open and accountable polities. Over time, more repressive
regimes will be created, making far harder any Western attempt to engage
reformist forces in Central Asia. In the long run, this will make it difficult
for new actors to break through the solid political, economic and military
co-operation that China and Russia will have established with the Central Asian
states.
Moreover, it's no secret that China needs energy and natural resources
to sustain its industrialisation and urbanisation path, nor that it has to look
for them abroad.
For security reasons it makes sense for the country to diversify its sources, but more than that, China is looking for non-traditional export
markets, as it moves up the value chain by seeking next generation technologies
in advanced manufacturing, electronics and aerospace.For example,Chinese exports to Russia have risen from just $2.7
billion in 2001 to $28.5 billion in 2007—although as a percentage of its total
exports, the increase from 1.4% to 2.4% is perhaps less impressive. Textiles,
machinery and electrical equipment make up 55% of those exports, with the rest
ranging from umbrellas to transportation equipment.
The Chinese Strategy on Eurasia in the Resources of Energy Perspective
The question of energy is also fundamental
to China’s Central Asia strategy. China, and the rest of Asia, has a need for energy that extends
far beyond presently available resources. Central Asia could bridge part of
this deficiency once its oil sector is fully functional with a proper pipeline
system, hence China’s—and Russia’s—keen involvement in the region. The
comparative absence of a European and US presence has caused the Central Asian
states to move closer to Asia, a move that could have devastating financial
effects in the West as it loses out on some very important assets, not to mention
its failure to influence the region politically. No one would be happier to
vacuum up Central Asia’s energy resources than China.
Moreover, on a few
energy exporters in the Middle East makes the People’s Republic vulnerable to
political disputes in this volatile region. China could be forced to balance
its concerns over energy security with political pressures from external
powers, most notably the United States. Chinese industry and foreign trade
could be severely affected by regime change or military conflict in any of
China’s chief Middle Eastern energy suppliers. Additionally, energy trade with
the Middle East comes attached with a $2-per-barrel premium that has been a
heavy burden on Chinese imports. More diversified oil and gas imports, with
some healthy competition between the exporting countries, could potentially
decrease this premium.
The priority China
attaches to the energy potential of Central Asia is probably best exemplified
by the record time in which the Atasu–Alashankou pipeline between Kazakhstan
and Xinjiang was constructed. This landmark project in Sino-Central Asian
energy relations began pumping oil in December 2005 and was completed in just
ten months, thanks largely to the economic and political commitment of China.
When the pipeline link between Kumkol and Kenkiyak in central Kazakhstan is
completed, China will also have a direct link to the oilfields in northern
Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea.
Furthermore,
in terms of energy consumption, China is now second only to the United States.
Its rapid pace of growth and increasing wealth of its citizens has led to
spiraling demand for energy, and for oil in particular. In 1993, the country
became an importer of oil and since then imports have risen steeply. Today,
China imports 40percent of its oil supplies and its dependence on oil (and gas)
imports will continue to grow.
Table-1 The Oil Import Dependense of China[2]
The Oil Import rate of China (%)
Year
|
(%)
|
2000
|
34
|
2010
|
60
|
2030
|
82
|
2
[2] Fan He &
Donghai Qin, ‘China’s Energy Strategy in the Twenty-First Century’, China &
World Economy, Cilt:14, Sayı: 2, 2006, s.100
In the medium term, China’s efforts to
enhance its energy security are likely to increase its influence in the Middle
East. This will pose a challenge to U.S. dominance of this part of the world
and further complicate the already difficult relations the United States has
with a number of countries in the region, notably Iran, as the current dispute
over Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
The results
of China’s energy diplomacy are being observed with growing unease, especially
in Asia, but also in other parts of the world. China’s impact on the world oil
market is growing, but also its geopolitical impact. Competition for energy is
exacerbating existing rivalries between China and a number of its neighbors.
The Trade Relations of China with Eurasia
China makes no secret of its attempts to win
trade advantages in Central Asia, advantages that can only be won at the
expense of Russia, primarily, but also Europe and the United States. According
to Chinese customs statistics, the trade volume between Central Asia and China
increased from a total of $465 million in 1992 to $7.7 billion in November
2005. This is a tremendous growth, especially as no other country has been able
to achieve a similar trade expansion with the Central Asian nations. China’s
share still amounts only to approximately half of Russia’s trade with the region
but is rapidly gaining ground on the latter in relative terms. China’s trade
with Central Asia is primarily in natural resources, especially oil and gas,
while Russia dominates the arms sales to the region.
Although the Chinese trade with Central Asia has
increased rapidly, it should be put in perspective. Bilateral trade with
Central Asian nations amounts to no more than 1 per cent of China’s total
foreign trade and is focused on a few key resources. This relatively small
trade is essentially with China’s western provinces, and it is estimated that
up to 80 per cent of it is conducted through Xinjiang alone. The trade is also
heavily disproportionate on the Central Asian side: close to 80 per cent of it
is with Kazakhstan, while Turkmenistan accounts only for 1 per cent. In sum,
the bilateral trade links are heavily concentrated on the border between
Xinjiang and Kazakhstan. Beijing has been trying to involve other Chinese
regions in trading with Central Asia, but the heavy emphasis on energy imports
to China and the export advantages Xinjiang enjoys over other Chinese provinces
mean the imbalance is likely to continue.
Central Asia also has a role to play as a transit
region in China’s foreign trade. As the major trade gains to be won for China
lie in reducing transaction costs with Europe, its largest foreign trading
partner, Beijing has heavily promoted continental overland trade corridors.
Transaction costs could be slashed if an effective land communication and
transport corridor between China and Europe were established. Consequently,
Beijing hopes to create a second Euro-Asia land bridge that would connect
China, Central Asia and Europe. (The first Euro-Asia land bridge is the
Trans-Siberian railway.) Currently, some 95 per cent of China’s trade with
Europe is conducted through a complicated and costly system entailing road,
rail and sea links. Delivery times via these routes can be anything from twenty
to forty days, but if the proposed second Euro-Asia land bridge is realised it
could cut the current transport time down to eleven days. Needless to say, this
would make Chinese trade with Europe even more competitive, and make Europe a
more attractive trading partner for China.
Besides the economic gains, a competitive
overland communication network would tie China closer to both Central Asia and
Europe. The transit fees accruing to the Central Asian states would give them a
significant economic boost and also ensure the political interest and
engagement of both China and Europe in stabilising and developing the region.
China has also invested substantially in
developing a viable infrastructure linking Xinjiang with the neighbouring
Central Asian nations. A railway between China, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan has
been planned, but its huge costs are prohibitive. China has improved its link
with Kyrgyzstan by renovating the Osh–Sarytash–Irkeshtam highway running from
the Kyrgyz south to the border of the People’s Republic. The China Development
Bank has financed with a $30 million grant the Norak tunnel under the Shar-Shar
pass in central Tajikistan. China has also helped develop Kyrgyzstan’s power
stations and power-transmission lines, both within Kyrgyzstan and across the
border to Kashgar in western China. The same applies to Kazakhstan, where the
China Development Bank has assisted in constructing power-transmission lines to
Xinjiang and in modernising power plants such as those in the north-eastern
Kazakh town of Ekibastuz.
Finally, we should mention about CEBA on trade between China and Euroasia ;
China
Eurasia Business Association (CEBA) is a non-profit organization
strategically linking business enterprises of China and Eurasia countries –
Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan. It aims to promote regional trade and cooperation, assisting
companies to find partners, clients and markets for their products.
Accelerating
trade between China and Eurasia countries, totaling over US$ 22bn in 2008, is
creating exciting opportunities for large, medium and small businesses in resources,
services and infrastructure, consumer goods sectors. To facilitate its activities and provide best possible service,
CEBA has representatives in Beijing, Almaty, and Ulaanbaatar.
CEBA
offers unique networking opportunities to business enterprises from and
interested in China and Eurasia region. CEBA strives to deliver value and service quality to its members,
providing up-to-date advice, research and market-entry support to China and to
Eurasia region. Partnership network provided by
CEBA, equips its members with global experience and local expertise to face any
challenges in the region with confidence and knowledge.
Conclusion
The present Chinese policy towards minorities is
conducted with three essential aspects: these are identification and recognition
of minorities, limited autonomy and repressive policy. The overall goal of the
Chinese policy towards minority groups is assimilation. However, these three
aspects have influenced the Uighurs adversely and have reinforced their ethnic
identity in the post-1949 era.
The Chinese government carried out the process of ascertaining ethnic identification and recognition following the pioneer study of the Chinese sociologist Fei Xiaoton. Xiaotond undertook a detailed study in the field and were able to identify 400 minority groups. As a result the Han Minzu was recognized as majority and the Shaosh Minzu as minority. However the major critics against PRC in identifying a nationality in China is its application of the Stalinist definition of a nation based on four common elements ; which are common language, geography, life and culture . Moreover scholars strongly argue that it shouldn't be totally applied since it disregards the diverse identities in China.
The second aspect of Chinese policy towards minority groups is characterized by “de jure autonomy'. In the strict sense of the term it is a limited autonomy. Although five autonomous provinces were officially established, the 1954 Chinese constitution clearly bars the right to secession. Instead it introduces regional autonomy. Under the same leverage the Uighur society was populated in the East Turkestan province. However, the introduction of regional autonomy accompanied by Han migration to East Turkestan turned the autonomous Uighur society into minority group in that area. This policy has eroded the very basis of autonomy extended to minority group.
The Chinese government carried out the process of ascertaining ethnic identification and recognition following the pioneer study of the Chinese sociologist Fei Xiaoton. Xiaotond undertook a detailed study in the field and were able to identify 400 minority groups. As a result the Han Minzu was recognized as majority and the Shaosh Minzu as minority. However the major critics against PRC in identifying a nationality in China is its application of the Stalinist definition of a nation based on four common elements ; which are common language, geography, life and culture . Moreover scholars strongly argue that it shouldn't be totally applied since it disregards the diverse identities in China.
The second aspect of Chinese policy towards minority groups is characterized by “de jure autonomy'. In the strict sense of the term it is a limited autonomy. Although five autonomous provinces were officially established, the 1954 Chinese constitution clearly bars the right to secession. Instead it introduces regional autonomy. Under the same leverage the Uighur society was populated in the East Turkestan province. However, the introduction of regional autonomy accompanied by Han migration to East Turkestan turned the autonomous Uighur society into minority group in that area. This policy has eroded the very basis of autonomy extended to minority group.
The repressive policies of the Chinese government against the
Uighur community has created chaos and reinforced their identity to the extent
of the Uighurs exposition to mortal threats. Mortal threat refers to threat
against the community's existence. To this effect the Uighurs established
Bingtuan or Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) in 1954. It is
basically a quasi-military organization meant for control of the ethnic
minority in East Turkestan. The XPCC was dissolved in 1975; however, in 1981 it
has been re-established mainly to serve as instrument for Chinese influence in
the area. In the 1990s the XPCC has been placed the authority of the central
government. It functions as a caretaker of the economy in the normal times,
whereas it serves as an effective army, in unrest times, to suppress resentment
from East Turkestan.
In terms of
cultural threats there are also actions taken by China. Chinese government has
been spending efforts in institutionalizing Chinese language and curbing
religious freedoms. These efforts served to the dilution of Uighur culture and
threatened their identity. Over the last half-century the Chinese language has
been institutionalized in the spheres of education, work and regional
administration. The greatest assault on Uighur's identity is on their religion,
Islam. Chinese government desires to build a strong China and does not
recognize the ethnic character of the Uighurs movement. The question of
separation or secession does not exist in the Chinese perception of the Uighurs
issue. Above all China regards East Turkestan as an integral part of itself and
hence it determinedly makes all effort to avoid national disintegration or it is
considered as ‘Spiitizim’.
These cases, along with
Chinese actions beyond Eurasia, exemplify China’s so called “peaceful rise”.
There is no force or threat to this unless one wants to count the pressures of
the market as force. Companies and governments who
cannot meet their debts or are short of cash will generally look for lenders
who offer the most favorable terms. And in the current climate China, sitting
atop enormous cash reserves, is more than willing to offer such terms in return
for exclusive access to the product, below-market prices, and opportunities for
further equity access in those firms and countries. In this way, these
borrowers get their cash but they also suffer, as debtors habitually do, from a
loss of freedom of action. To a considerably greater degree than before, they
are tied to China’s economic chariot and to its economic and political
preferences. In this context, it is hardly a surprise that for years Russian
leaders have been publicly warning that if Russia did not get its house in
order, China would gain a commanding economic position in Russian Asia, or
warning against the rise of China as exporter, importer, and now lender in
Central Asia.
China is undoubtedly emerging as one of the two
major actors in Central Asia, and over time it may become the most powerful.
The relative decline of Russia and the failure of the West to act in the region
have played out well for China. Its growing influence in Central Asia has
created the potential for a power struggle with Russia. Nevertheless, both
states will remain for the foreseeable future the major regional actors.
Politically, the West has been increasingly marginalised as a result of
Beijing’s strategy to increase its own role in Central Asia and the failure of
the West to understand the situation there. Should this continue, Central Asia
risks being dominated by China and Russia, and the region as a whole will move
in a less democratic direction.
Resources;
*’Çin’in Avrasya Stratejisi’ / Barış Adıbelli
*’Büyük Avrasya Projesi ABD,Rusya ve Çin’in Varolma Mücadelesi’ /
Barış Adıbelli
* Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütü: Çin
Ve Rusya’nın Avrasya Açılımı / Ahmet HACALOĞLU K.
*http://www.usak.org.tr/dosyalar/dergi/yC7Rs651dAHbXQIUFf9YCkm8ZOkeVD.pdf
*http://www.china-eurasia.org/
*http://blogs.euobserver.com/petersen/2010/07/10/china-and-eurasian-energy/
*http://www.chinaeurasia.org/
*http://www.chinaeurasia.org/
